- As tensions rise across the Indo-Pacific and law of the sea issues become more salient, we have witnessed more submarine cable cleavages globally, along with new bureaucratic maneuvers by China to slow the laying of submarine cables.
- The importance of undersea and maritime domain awareness, including enhanced intelligence and cyber capabilities, is seemingly not lost on Japan’s defense establishment.
- China’s growing maritime presence, especially in the underwater domain, will continue to be a menace for many smaller nations across the region.
- China’s growing maritime presence, especially in the underwater domain, will continue to be a menace for many smaller nations across the region.
In a new era of maritime great power competition, Japan’s government appears to be pushing forward in its growing embrace of the underwater domain through the sponsorship of new initiatives and other programs that bring together various partners and allies from across the Indo-Pacific. As examined below, Japan has invested significantly in recent years in the following two areas tied to underwater domain awareness: Increased regional and international cooperation and capacity building and more funding and support to grow its abilities to secure and monitor submarine fiber-optic cables across the region. Combined, Japan’s latest activities provide excellent examples and a model for other maritime great powers to emulate, especially as China’s maritime presence grows more significant and threatening in the underwater domain.
Beginning in the mid-2000s, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (or JICA) supported an increase to grant aid programs that provided Coast Guard vessels to like-minded partners and allies. Official Security Assistance (OSA) has only been formally adopted when it was referenced in Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), but the government’s embrace of security assistance has been evolving over the past two decades.[1]
Increased Regional and International Cooperation and Capacity Building
JICA first approved the donation of some of the first Coast Guard patrol vessels to Indonesia dating back to 2006. (JICA also provided funding to Indonesia in 2005 to stand up its coast guard.) Following the 2013 NSS, the government began to ramp up more of its security assistance programs systematically as it supported additional programming in maritime safety and security amidst a rising China. In 2015, JICA and the JCG donated assets to the coast guards of Djibouti and Vietnam. The six donated ships to Vietnam helped to build up both its Fisheries Surveillance Force and Coast Guard and were part of a larger 500-million-yen aid package dedicated to supporting maritime security. These aid packages were followed by vessel donations to the Philippines in 2016, Malaysia in 2017, Sri Lanka in 2018, and Kenya in 2019. In the Philippines, Japan donated 12 patrol craft, 13 fast boats, and a coastal radar surveillance system—by comparison, Kenya received 17 patrol vessels. In Sri Lanka, JICA financed two fast patrol craft and two offshore patrol boats as part of a recent $180 million package. Japan also regularly donates smaller and less expensive patrol craft, including a recent donation of 24 coastal rescue vessels to the Bangladesh Coast Guard in 2018.[2]
In addition to vessel donations, the Japan Coast Guard (or JCG) has been actively involved with joint exercises, trainings, strategic dialogues, diplomatic outreach, and other capacity-building programs with numerous neighboring or regional nations since the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the Bay of Bengal, Japan’s government has been actively involved with India’s Coast Guard since 2000 as part of its sustained presence across the Indian Ocean. The two nations regularly host the Sahyog-Kaijin exercises that now include the Maldives and Sri Lanka in an observer status. Beginning in 2013, Japan and Sri Lanka also established a Dialogue on Maritime Security and Oceanic Issues, including increased cooperation on maritime law enforcement, search and rescue missions, humanitarian and disaster relief, and environmental protection.[3]
Japan’s government has similarly signed multiple memorandums of cooperation (MOCs) with the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Maldives, and Vietnam that include high-level meetings and joint maritime exercises. Japan also recently signed a Statement of Intent in 2018 with Australia’s Border Force, which does not have a coast guard or formal maritime law enforcement agency. Certainly, the bilateral relationship with Australia still has much room for growth and improvement. Across ASEAN and Indo-Pacific, the JCG has also begun to deploy Mobile Cooperation Teams (MCTs) to support local coast guards with a variety of capacity-building assistance. The MCT program began in 2017 when it deployed its first team to work with the Philippines Coast Guard. The JCG has since conducted around 15 MCT missions or more to other countries across the Indo-Pacific. The MCTs have also conducted workshops on IUU fishing, criminal investigations, disaster relief, search and rescue, and marine safety.[4]
Aside from the MCTs, the JCG recently announced that it will construct a new multi-purpose patrol vessel, its biggest ever at 30,000 gross tonnage and a price tag of $480 million. It would also be the largest in the world, surpassing China’s Coast Guard vessel CCG 5901, the reigning titleholder. Japan’s multipurpose patrol vessel will be able to accommodate up to 1,000 persons and is expected to be ready for commissioning by 2029. International cooperation and collaboration must be recognized increasingly as a core mission of JCG—and will be key to enhancing more underwater domain awareness initiatives.[5]
The Growing Importance of Securing Submarine Fiber-Optic Cables
One additional component that is pushing Japan to become so vital to maritime security across the Indo-Pacific is the government’s ability to produce, protect, and repair the submarine cables that line the ocean floors. The estimated 540 undersea fiber-optic cables that line the World Ocean are responsible for transmitting more than 95 percent of voice and data traffic. This also amounts to around $10 trillion in financial transactions each day. Anything that disrupts the information and financial flows across these oceanic networks can have significant spillover effects.[6]
Certainly, the vast majority of fiber-optic cable breaks are tied to earthquakes, dredging, fishing trawlers, or ship anchors since most of the cables are only about the width of a garden-hose.[7]
The rise of submarine cable cuts in recent years falls into a larger global pattern of growing security challenges tied to these subsea information highways from Europe to Asia.
Japan in particular has an opportunity to become more of a regional and global leader in submarine cable laying, repair, and security. To begin, Japanese firms are frequently ranked as some of the world’s largest submarine cable manufacturers. The top cable producer is the U.S. firm SUBCOM, while some of the other top manufacturers are Japanese, including the Nippon Electric Company’s (NEC) subsidiary, Ocean Cable and Communication (OCC), and Fujitsu. The top five U.S., European, and Japanese firms together account for around 90 percent of global cable production, while the Chinese-based Hengtong Optic-Electric Co.—an optical firm that acquired Huawei’s submarine cable division in 2020—holds just 10 percent of the remaining market share. At present, Japan also has four to six repair and cable-laying ships, compared with China which currently owns at least two. The telecommunications firms Nippon Telegraph and Telephone and KDDI own or charter 2 or 3 each, while the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force reportedly owns one ship, the JS Muroto. Combined, they make Japan one of the most consequential cable laying and repair countries in the world.[8]
The importance of undersea and maritime domain awareness, including enhanced intelligence and cyber capabilities, is seemingly not lost on Japan’s defense establishment. The activities of JMSDF’s cable-laying ship, JS Muroto, are rarely publicized, and JMSDF members are reportedly tight-lipped about the ship’s operations, owing to their highly classified nature. Yet every year, the JS Muroto conducts cable-laying exercises with the U.S. Navy at its base in Guam, a promising sign of awareness between the two allies of the necessity to defend these networks. The JMSDF in conjunction with the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC) and the U.S. Navy also continues to invest heavily in the research and development of future-generation UUVs.[10] Furthermore, the JMSDF recently announced that it was standing up a newly organized and named Fleet Information Warfare Command that better coordinates and manages information warfare and a spectrum of naval domain awareness activities. The new command will now include just two groups, Operational Intelligence and Cyber Defense.[11]
Aside from a hard security angle, a ripe opportunity also exists for Japan’s government to tie further subsea investments into its Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework that aims to promote increased multi-layered connectivity and economic prosperity across the region. Japan has already demonstrated its leadership and ability to support several island nations either under duress following a major natural disaster or for nations that seek to upgrade their submarine cables and broader access to faster internet connections and the 5G network. Most recently in Tonga, Japan helped to support the repair of 56 miles of a subsea internet cable that had ruptured following a 7.6 magnitude earthquake. Japan also worked with Australia and the United States to finance and lay the Palau Spur Cable in the Indian Ocean, the first trilateral infrastructure project of its kind. Beyond Oceania, other countries have similarly expressed a preference to work with Japan over other countries. Chile, for example, opted to reject a Chinese proposal in favor of the one offered by Japan’s government for the first submarine fiber-optic cable between South America and the Indo-Pacific. Japan could indeed emerge as a viable alternative to the construction of new cross-regional cable networks.[12]
Japan’s government has the ability to remain a world leader that can manufacture, repair, and protect these highly valuable submarine cables across the global commons and in an Indo-Pacific way.[13]
It is therefore incumbent upon Japan, the United States, and other like-minded partners and allies to continue investing in many of the efforts and initiatives laid out here to ensure the future stability and security and the global commons.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the National Defense University.
References:
Geoffrey F. Gresh (Professor of International Relations, National Defense University)
About Author
Geoffrey F. Gresh is a Professor of International Security Studies at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., specializing in maritime and naval affairs. He has held numerous leadership roles at CISA, including Department Chair and Director of the South and Central Asia Security Studies Program. Gresh has an extensive academic background with a previous fellowship at Sciences Po in Paris. He was also a Visiting Researcher at the National Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. His research focuses on global maritime security, particularly in Eurasia, and he has authored several books, including To Rule Eurasia’s Waves (2020), and contributed to various policy publications. Gresh’s work explores critical geopolitical dynamics, including the rise of subsea warfare and the strategic importance of maritime chokepoints.